Kurzbeschreibung

Reihe: Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsvereinheitlichung

Die Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes können von verschiedenen Staatsorganen unterschiedlich, jedoch gleichermaßen vertretbar ausgelegt werden. Lisa Rabeneick vertritt die Auffassung, dass das Bundesverfassungsgericht zuweilen 'Weak-Form Judicial Review' ausüben und davon absehen sollte, seine Grundrechtsauslegung an die Stelle derer des Parlaments zu setzen, wenn dessen Verständnis gleichermaßen plausibel ist.

Inhaltsübersicht:
A. Introduction
I. Proposal of a ‘blended system’ of judicial review - II. Argument for a ‘blended system’ of rights-based judicial review of federal legislation within the German constitutional order

B. An alternative form of judicial review within the German constitutional order
I. Weak-form judicial review and the related international debate -II. Meaning of ‘weak-form and strong-form judicial review’

C. The German strong-form system of rights-based judicial review of legislation
I. Historical decision for a system of constitutional judicial review - II. Existing constitutional design mechanism providing for the court’s strong-form review powers - III. Conclusion and outlook

D. Towards weak-form judicial review in Germany
I. Proposal of a ‘blended system’ of judicial review within the German constitutional order review - II. Absence of weak-form judicial review ideas in Germany - III. Placing the proposal within the German constitutional debate - IV. Concluding observations: Proposal of a blended system within the German constitutional order

E. Benefits of a blended system of rights-based judicial review of legislation within the German constitutional order
I. Previously identified benefits - II. Creating a more appropriate constitutional balance between constitutional principles conflicting in the shape of the court’s strong-form review powers - III. Additional outcome-related constitutional benefits - IV. Conclusion

F. Implementing the proposed blended system on the institutional level
I. Preliminary considerations - II. Defining constitutional constraints - III. Existing room within key constitutional constraints for other forms of weak-form judicial review - IV. Outlook: Additional conversation on the appropriateness of weak-form review

G. Conclusion